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EASTERN ST. CORP. v. EISLER
Legum's witnesses. Thus, perhaps, the case should have
been sent back to the trial court for it to reassess the ques-
tion of Brown's due care and his credibility in the light of
the correct principles of law.
ROBERT JAMES GERSTUNG
Discovery Of Documents And Property
Before Issued Joined
Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler'
Charles Eisler, the appellee stockholder, filed an
amended bill of complaint in The Circuit Court of Baltimore
City, alleging fraud and incompetency on the part of cor-
porate officials, and seeking the appointment of a receiver
to institute legal proceedings against said officials. Subse-
quently he filed a motion under Discovery Rule 4 of The
General Rules of Practice and Procedure2 for a court order
giving him access to records and documents in the posses-
sion of the appellant corporation. A few days later, the
appellant corporation filed a demurrer to the amended bill
of complaint. Prior to ruling upon this demurrer, the Chan-
cellor granted the motion and issued an order for discovery.
Appellant took an immediate appeal from the order so
entered,' contending, among other things, that the discovery
order could not be issued until after issue had been joined
in the proceeding.' Upon this contention, the Court of
Appeals held:
"... cases might conceivably arise where discovery
might be ordered before issue joined and this court
does not intend to hereby flatly rule that the remedy
of discovery as provided for by Rule 4, supra, should
never be granted until issue is joined, but the instant
case is not one of these."5
The Court of Appeals found the instant case not a proper
one for early discovery because discovery may only be
had if there is a genuine proceeding before the court. It
'181 Md. 526, 30 A. 2d 867 (1943).
G.R.P.P., Pt. Two, II, Rule 4.
"Note, Appealability of Denials of Motions to Implead and Related Dis-
cretionary Orders in Maryland, 12 Md. L. Rev. 145, 151 (1951), discusses
appealability of discovery orders and the reason for allowing the direct
appeal from the court order in the Instant case.
' A cause shall be deemed at issue upon the filing of the answer; Gen.
Eq. Rule 21.
'5Supra, n. 1, 534.
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was, therefore, held reversible error to allow discovery in
the instant case without first dismissing the demurrer, if
proper, and thereby establishing the actual existence of a
justiciable cause of action. The true basis for the denial of
discovery was the failure of the procedure used in the case
to satisfy the conditions of the Discovery Rule and not be-
cause of any actual or supposed rule prohibiting discovery
before answer has been filed.
The controlling discovery rule provides in part:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court
may, at any time in any proceeding, (1) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not
privileged, which may constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the proceeding and
which are in his possession, custody, or control; ..."6
This rule is patterned after Federal Rule 34, which in
regard to time of discovery merely specified that discovery
may be ordered by "the court in which an action is pend-
ing".7 Neither the Federal Rule nor the Maryland Rule
expressly states that discovery of documents and property
may or may not be had before issue has been joined. To
some commentaries on the Federal Rule, the above quoted
phrase from that rule signifies the possibility of such early
discovery, 8 and on the basis of this it would seem to follow
that the words in the Maryland Rule that "the court may at
any time in any proceeding" would even more strongly
support such an interpretation. The different wording of
the Maryland Rule would also tend to reduce the weight of
the argument of the Federal cases which find an implied
limitation upon the power of the courts to permit such
early discovery before joinder of issue from the require-
ment that matter produced by use of the rule be material.'
0 Supra, n. 2.
'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34, 28 U. S. C. A. (1950), 281.
84 MOORE, FEDMAL PRACrICE (2d ed., 1950), 2438. See: Bough v. Lee,
29 F. Supp. 498 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675
(S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
9 The following cases were decided on the theory that discovery should
not be permitted until answer is filed, arguing that until Issue is joined, it
is impossible to determine what matters are material: Piest v Tide Water
Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 295 (S. D. N. Y., 1938) ; Employers Mut. Liability Ins.
Co. v. Blue Line T. Co., 2 F. R. D. 121 (W. D. Mo., 1941) ; Hartford Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 13 F. R. D. 127 (D. Del., 1952).
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The federal courts have been in accord with the Court
of Appeals in refusing to interpret the discovery rules as
making it impossible to have discovery in an appropriate
case before joinder of issue ° and have both permitted such
discovery and denied it, according to the circumstances of
the particular cases. In the instant case the Court of
Appeals recognized the similarity between the Maryland
and the federal rules relating to discovery and the resulting
possibility of looking to the federal decisions for precedent."
The tendency in the federal courts has been to refuse or
at least postpone discovery unless they have reasonable
certainty that the information so obtained will have occa-
sion to be used. 2 If determination of certain preliminary
questions may dispose of the case before joinder of issue,
discovery will usually be deferred until such questions have
been settled. Therefore, if there is a demurrer to the plead-
ing of the plaintiff, or a plea of limitations, 3 or the pro-
priety of the plaintiff's cause of action is challenged in
any other manner,' 4 the court should rule thereon before
doing anything else in the furtherance of the suit. Where
the plaintiff seeks discovery, he must satisfy the court as
to the existence of a possible cause of action and show
sufficient grounds to entitle him to an available remedy,'5
and only after it has been ruled or conceded that he has
met these requirements will the court be justified in allow-
ing to him the privileges of discovery." Such an interpre-
tation is necessary in the interest of economy and for the
faithful exercise of the power conferred by the discovery
"0 United States v. North Coast Transp. Co., 8 F. R. D. 62 (W. D. Wash.,
1947) ; C. F. Simonin's Sons. Inc. v. American Can Co., 24 F. Supp. 765
(E. D. Pa., 1938) ; Courteau v. Interlake S.S. Co., 1 F. R. D. 525 (W. D.
Mich., 1941) ; Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460 (E. D. Pa., 1940).
n Supra, n. 1, 530.
I2 BARRON AND HOLTZOSF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Rules Ed.,
1950) 519, Sec. 800: ". . . it is not the purpose of the rule (34) to en-
courage unnecessary and vexatious discovery. There is no good purpose to
be served by extensive discovery as to matters which will not be contested."
Parenthetical material added.
"Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 36 F. Supp. 568 (D.
Mass., 1941).
Pyle v. Pyle, 81 F. Supp. 207 (W. D. La., 1948).
"5Before granting discovery the plaintiff must convince the court that
there is reasonable ground to believe a cause of action exists which can be
proven if the facilities are afforded him; Columbia Pictures Corporation v.
Rogers, 81 F. Supp. 580 (S. D. W. Va., 1949); C. F. Simonin's Sons v.
American Can Co., supra, n. 10; Fishman v. Marcouse, supra, n. 10. In
Swarthmore Junior, Inc. v. Miss Breeley Junior Frocks, 52 F. Supp. 992
(S. D. N. Y., 1943), discovery was deferred until the judge could rule
whether or not there was actually a question of design patent infringements
for the jury.
"Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643 (Hawaii, 1953).
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rule, which power exists only if there is an actual suit
pending. 7
The power to grant discovery being also limited by the
rule to the production of matter that is material to the case
at hand, tends to limit the instances in which discovery
may be had before issue. Although the test of relevancy in
a motion for discovery of documents and property is not
as strict as that which governs admissibility of evidence
upon trial, 8 the court nevertheless may defer discovery
until pleadings have progressed to a point where the issues
are more clearly defined. In this area the court has a greater
degree of freedom, and thus, some will be fairly liberal in
construing this condition so as to allow discovery before
issues are really defined. 9
In the final analysis it appears that discovery is not being
denied because the rule is interpreted as prohibiting dis-
covery before joinder of issue, but because certain condi-
tions precedent to discovery have not been met so that the
court has not the power to grant discovery. If an action is
pending and the court has jurisdiction and all requirements
of the discovery rule are met to the satisfaction of the court,
it will have ample authority and discretion to allow dis-
covery before answer has been filed.2"
VINcENT R. GROH
Right Of A Defaulting Building Contractor To Recover
In Maryland Upon The Contract Or In
Quasi Contract
Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead'
The appellee, a contractor, brought suit to recover the
balance due on a written contract for the clearing and grad-
ing of the site of a threatre plus certain extras, less the cost
of completing a part of the work and damages for the delay.
1' Egan v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., 26 F. Supp. 621 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939); United States v. American Locomotive Co., 6 F. R. D. 35
'(N. D. Ind., 1946). In Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 84 F. Supp. 740 (M. D.
'Pa., 1949), a motion for discovery was held improper where a court order
had temporarily suspended the court proceedings.
18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34, 28 U. S. C. A. 296, n. 23.
'9 Woods v. Kornfeld, 9 F. R. D. 678 (M. D. Pa., 1950) ; Sutherland Paper
Co. v. Grant Paper 'Box Co., 8 F. R. D. 416 (W. D. Pa., 1948) ; Piest v. Tide
Water Oil Co., supra, n. 9; Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Blue Line
T. Co., supra, n. 9; Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co.,
supra, n. 9; Hallman v. Gross, 190 Md. 563, 59 A. 2d 304 (1948).
Supra, n. 10.
1206 Md. 610, 112A. 2d 901 (1955).
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